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Abstract. A large and growing body of research in computational psychiatry 
draws on Bayesian modelling to illuminate the dysfunctions and aberrations that 
underlie psychiatric disorders. After identifying the chief attractions of this 
research programme, we argue that its typical focus on abstract, domain-general 
inferential processes is likely to obscure many of the distinctive ways in which 
the human mind can break down and malfunction. We illustrate this by appeal to 
psychosis and the social phenomenology of delusions.  
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It is common to think that psychiatric disorders are caused by dysfunctions in or disturbances 
to the neural mechanisms that underlie human psychology. If so, significant progress in our 
understanding of psychiatric disorders demands a model of how the healthy or typical brain 
functions.  
In recent decades, a large and growing body of research in cognitive science has sought to 
model the brain as a statistical inference mechanism, constructing and refining probabilistic 
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models and hypotheses about the world from the streams of noisy and ambiguous information 
it leaves on our sensory transducers (Doya et al. 2007; Knill and Pouget 2004). For example, 
theorists have drawn on Bayesian statistics to illuminate learning and inference across a wide 
variety of cognitive domains, including perception, motor control, intuitive theories, and 
more (see Doya et al. 2007). A prominent manifestation of this work has been in predictive 
coding, an influential theory that models the brain as a hierarchically structured prediction 
machine, comparing internally generated predictions of sensory information against the 
sensory information generated by the body and environment and striving to minimize the 
difference between the two (see Clark 2013; Friston 2005; Hohwy 2013; Rao and Ballard 
1999).  
Such ideas increasingly provide the framework for understanding healthy brain function that 
guides research in computational psychiatry (Friston et al. 2014; Teufel and Fletcher 2016). 
Specifically, researchers have sought to model a large range of psychiatric disorders by 
appeal to dysfunctions or aberrations in the neural mechanics of statistical inference and 
decision-making, including schizophrenia (Adams et al. 2013), autism (Lawson et al. 2014), 
Parkinson’s disease (O’Callaghan et al. 2017), anorexia (Gadsby and Hohwy 2019), addiction 
(Schwartenbeck et al. 2015), depression (Barrett et al. 2016), and more. As Griffin and 
Fletcher (2017, p.265) put it,  
“The growing understanding of the brain as an organ of predictive inference has been central 
to establishing computational psychiatry as a framework for understanding how alterations in 
brain processes can drive the emergence of high-level psychiatric symptoms” (Griffin and 
Fletcher 2017, p.265).  
Some proponents of this approach are extremely optimistic about its explanatory reach. 
Carhart-Harris and Friston (2019, p.334), for example, argue that “most, if not all, 
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expressions of mental illness can be traced to aberrations in the normal mechanics of 
hierarchical predictive coding” (our emphasis).  
We have two principal aims in this article. First, we will identify and clarify some of the core 
theoretical attractions of what we call “Bayesian psychiatry” as a research programme. 
Second, we will argue that this research programme is often hindered by a focus on content-
neutral, domain-general inferential processes that abstract away from much that is distinctive 
about human psychology. Drawing on psychosis and the social nature of clinical delusions to 
illustrate, we will argue that this focus likely blinds Bayesian psychiatry to many specific 
ways in which the human mind can break down and malfunction.  
We structure the article as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we introduce Bayesian psychiatry (S2) 
and outline applications of this research programme to understanding psychosis (S3). In 
Section 4 we draw on the distinctive social phenomenology of psychosis to argue that such 
applications seem inadequate and in Section 5 we suggest that combining Bayesian modelling 
with information about the functional specializations of the human brain might help to 
address this problem. We conclude in Section 6 by summarising our conclusions and 
highlighting important areas for future research.  
2. Bayesian Psychiatry 
Computational psychiatry seeks to build computational models of the dysfunctions and 
aberrations that underlie psychiatric disorders. It is built on two central ideas: first, psychiatry 
should strive to trace psychiatric disorders to dysfunctions in neural mechanisms; second, 
neural mechanisms are computational mechanisms, that is, mechanisms that extract and 
process information through transformations of and operations over information-encoding 
states and structures. Computational modelling of psychiatric disorders brings many 
theoretical benefits. For example, it provides an explanatorily illuminating link between 
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neurobiological and psychological levels of description, it forces theories – and thus the 
predictions of theories – to be explicit and mathematically precise, and it grounds psychiatric 
explanation in independently well-established models of brain function in computational and 
cognitive neuroscience (see Friston et al. 2014; Teufel and Fletcher 2016).  
Consonant with their broader influence in neuroscience, computational psychiatry has been 
dominated by neural network models, reinforcement learning models, and Bayesian models, 
the latter of which constitute our focus here. Bayes’ theorem is an implication of probability 
theory that specifies the optimal procedure for redistributing the probabilities assigned to 
hypotheses in light of new information. Specifically, the aim of Bayesian inference is to 
calculate the posterior probability of a hypothesis conditional on novel evidence, 
p(hypothesis | evidence). Bayes’ theorem states that this is proportional to how well the 
hypothesis predicts the evidence, i.e. the likelihood p(evidence | hypothesis), multiplied by 
the hypothesis’s probability before encountering the evidence, i.e. the prior p(hypothesis). To 
calculate the posterior, this product is then divided by the categorical probability of the 
evidence, the marginal likelihood p(evidence), which is typically calculated as a sum (for 
discrete states) or integration (for continuous states) over the product of the priors and 
likelihoods for all possible hypotheses. Importantly, exact Bayesian inference of this sort is 
often infeasible when dealing with large or continuous hypothesis spaces. Thus, statistics and 
artificial intelligence have developed various algorithms for approximating Bayesian 
inference, the most influential of which are stochastic sampling approximations and 
deterministic variational approximations.   
The growing importance of Bayesian inference and its approximations as a model of neural 
information processing can be traced to two principal factors. First, neuroscientists have 
increasingly recognised that inductive inference under profound uncertainty is a fundamental 
problem that the brain confronts. Bayesian inference provides the optimal method for solving 
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this problem. Thus, it is argued that we should expect – perhaps on evolutionary grounds – 
that the brain implements some form of this solution. As Mathys et al. (2011, p.1) et al. put it,  
‘Since a Bayesian learner processes information optimally, it should have an evolutionary 
advantage over other types of agents, and one might therefore expect the human brain to have 
evolved such that it implements an ideal Bayesian learner’.  
Second, experimental neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists have uncovered evidence 
across a wide variety of domains that human inference is approximately Bayes-optimal (see 
Clark 2013; Knill and Pouget 2004).  
Both factors have motivated the Bayesian brain hypothesis, the hypothesis that information 
processing in the brain – or at least certain parts of the brain – is approximately Bayesian 
(Knill and Pouget 2004). However, this hypothesis is silent on how the brain implements 
approximate Bayesian inference. One of the most influential theories for addressing this issue 
is hierarchical predictive coding.   
Strictly speaking, predictive coding is an encoding strategy in which only the unpredicted 
elements of a signal are fed forward for further stages of information processing. In 
neuroscience, this encoding strategy was advanced as a model of visual processing by Rao 
and Ballard (1999), which proposes that cortical networks acquire and update probabilistic 
models of the causes of sensory signals through a process in which successive levels of 
cortical hierarchies attempt to minimize the error in their predictions of activity registered at 
the level below them. In recent work, however, “predictive coding” often refers to an 
extension and elaboration of this model of perceptual processing to encompass neural 
information processing more generally. Thus, Sterzer et al. (2017) write that, 
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‘Predictive coding conceives of the brain as a hierarchy whose goal is to maximize the 
evidence for its model of the world by comparing prior beliefs with sensory data, and using 
the resultant prediction errors (PEs) to update the model’ (our emphasis).  
We will use the term “predictive processing” to refer to this more global theory of brain 
function (see, e.g., Clark 2013; Friston 2005; 2010; Hohwy 2013). There are two aspects of 
predictive processing that will be important in what follows. The first is a conception of 
neural information processing in terms of hierarchical precision-weighted prediction error 
minimization. “Prediction error” refers to the divergence between the brain’s predictions of 
incoming information and the information itself. “Precision” names the inverse of the 
variance of a probability density, and thus the degree of certainty or confidence associated 
with it. Precision-weighting therefore adjusts the degree to which predictions are updated in 
light of prediction errors as a function of the relative uncertainty associated with prior 
expectations and incoming evidence. Consonant with the hierarchical structure of the 
neocortex, this process of uncertainty-weighted prediction error minimization is thought to be 
iterated up an inferential hierarchy, with each successive level attempting to predict activity 
at the level below it.   
The second component is the idea that prediction error minimization constitutes the 
overarching function, goal, or “imperative” of the brain (Friston 2010; Hohwy 2013). This 
radical view is often motivated by or grounded in the broader idea, central to the free energy 
principle (Friston 2010), that all self-organizing systems obey an overarching imperative to 
minimize surprise or maximize model evidence. On this view, action – typically described as 
active inference – is also modelled as a form of prediction error minimization, except that 
rather than updating predictions to match incoming sensory information, action involves 
intervening on the world to match sensory information to the brain’s expectations, the most 
fundamental of which are thought to be installed by evolution (see Hohwy 2013).  
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These broad ideas about brain function have played a central role in a large and growing body 
of research in computational psychiatry (see Friston et al. 2014; Teufel and Fletcher 2016). 
We will henceforth use the term “Bayesian psychiatry” to refer to this broad research 
programme. Setting aside the details and potential criticisms of specific theories and 
hypotheses within Bayesian psychiatry, we believe that it constitutes a promising framework 
for modelling psychopathologies for reasons over and above the more general theoretical 
attractions of computational psychiatry.  
First, the Bayesian brain and related ideas were not developed to explain psychiatric 
disorders, but rather have compelling independent support as models of neural information 
processing (see Knill and Pouget 2004). Second, conceptualising the brain as an inferential 
organ provides an explanatorily illuminating link between the biological mechanisms that 
implement information processing and the intentionality and the role of misrepresentation 
essential to many psychiatric disorders (Friston et al. 2014). Third, Bayesian psychiatry 
draws attention to the important role of uncertainty and uncertainty management in 
psychiatric disorders (Hohwy 2013). Fourth, the emphasis on bi-directional hierarchical 
processing within theories such as predictive coding constitutes a promising framework for 
understanding the complex and often bi-directional interplay between percepts, beliefs, and 
more abstract self-narratives that are central to many psychiatric disorders (Sterzer et al. 
2018). Finally, and most importantly, Bayesian psychiatry has undeniably been explanatorily 
fecund, generating myriad novel conceptualisations and surprising predictions (Teufel and 
Fletcher 2016). 
In the next section, we will illustrate these attractions by appeal to influential predictive 
coding models of psychosis.  
3. Psychosis and Bayesian Psychiatry 
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Psychosis is a complex and heterogeneous functional disorder that is generally understood as 
an impairment in reality testing. The term is used as an umbrella category for a cluster of 
symptoms that comprise hallucinations and delusions that can occur across many psychiatric, 
neurodevelopmental, and neurodegenerative disorders. Thus, psychotic symptoms have been 
widely researched in affective disorders such as bipolar disease (Shinn et al., 2012) and in 
neurodegenerative ones such as Parkinson’s Disease (Fénelon et al., 2010) and dementia with 
Lewy bodies (Waters et al., 2014). The clinical manifestation of psychosis is varied and 
heterogenous across these nosological categories, as well as within each disorder. Here we 
will focus mostly on psychosis in schizophrenia, where much of the research within Bayesian 
psychiatry on psychosis has been focused.   
3.1. Psychosis in Schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia is a mental disorder affecting 0.3 to 0.7% of the population worldwide (DSM 
5th ed., 2013). Patients diagnosed with schizophrenia can show a heterogeneity of symptoms, 
which are classified as either positive or negative, where positive symptoms include 
hallucinations and delusions and negative symptoms include a lack of useful goal-directed 
behaviours (Garofalo et al., 2017), anhedonia (i.e. a lack of anticipation and seeking of 
rewards), poverty of speech, and asociality (Frith, 2005). Research has shown that the 
aetiological roots of schizophrenia span from genetic risk factors (Tsuang, 2000) to social and 
environmental ones (Mortensen et al., 1999; see below Section 5), including complex 
interactions between them (Ursini et al., 2018). Further, it is important to distinguish changes 
in patients’ psychopathology across time. For example, chronic patients with schizophrenia 
tend to have fixed delusions, whilst these tend to be less immovable in those at early stages of 
the disorder, such as in First-Episode Psychosis, where individuals often retain insight about 
the implausibility of delusional thoughts (see Sterzer et al., 2018). Even though the exact 
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causes of schizophrenia are still not well understood, there is abundant evidence implicating 
different neurotransmitters (especially dopamine and glutamate) and multiple brain areas (see 
Gill and Grace 2016).  
Hallucinations take different forms in schizophrenia, with heterogeneous manifestations 
across different sensory modalities, although auditory hallucinations are the most studied 
(Montagnese et al. 2020). These tend to revolve around hearing voices, either individual or in 
conversation, which often generate a running commentary on the individual’s behaviour. 
Although the specific contents of delusions vary widely across individuals and cultures, they 
tend to cluster in a surprisingly small subset of themes, almost all of which concern the 
individual’s standing in the social world (Bentall et al. 1991; Gold 2017). Here, we will focus 
largely on the most common form of delusions, persecutory delusions, an extreme form of 
paranoia which involves the unsubstantiated belief that an agent or group of agents wants to 
harm the delusional individual (Freeman 2016).  
3.2. Predictive Coding and Psychosis 
The most important precursors to predictive coding models of psychosis are those that posit a 
dysfunction in the integration of sensory experience, learned expectations, and higher-level 
explanations of such experiences (see Sterzer et al. 2018). For example, Maher (1974) 
famously proposed that delusions are best understood as reasonable responses to anomalous 
experiences caused by dysfunctions in or damages to perceptual mechanisms. Building on 
this research and on the aforementioned work implicating dopamine in psychosis, Kapur 
(2003) suggested that dopaminergic dysregulation in schizophrenia might disrupt the 
attribution of salience to stimuli. According to this influential aberrant salience hypothesis, 
seemingly irrelevant events and stimuli elicit excessive attributions of salience and delusions 
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are understood as the individual’s attempts to make sense of and explain such anomalous 
experiences.  
Another influential precursor comes from the model of control of intended action developed 
by Frith et al. (2000). Here one’s sense of agency can be seen as emerging from the 
integration of different agency cues, including both internal (e.g. from processes serving 
motor control) and external cues (e.g. feedback from sensory systems), as well as prior 
information, where each kind of information is weighed by its reliability. To feel like the 
agent of one’s actions, this model holds that agents must be able to reliably anticipate the 
sensory consequences of such actions. A failure in such prediction will thus render one’s own 
behaviour surprising, thus suggesting an external cause. By extending this framework to 
psychosis more generally (Moore and Fletcher, 2012), positive symptoms can be seen as 
emerging from repeated confusion between external and internal origins of sensory data. 
Experimental evidence confirms this loss of normal attenuation of sensory feedback for 
motor action in patients with psychosis (Shergill et al, 2005; Blakemore et al., 2000). 
Such ideas have laid the groundwork for the development of what Sterzer et al. (2017, p.634) 
call the “canonical predictive coding account of psychosis.” According to this model, the 
emergence of psychosis can be explained in terms of a dysfunction in the interaction between 
and integration of top-down expectations and bottom-up information. As noted above, 
optimal prediction error minimization necessitates that prediction errors are effectively 
weighted by their precision or certainty. The canonical predictive coding accounts posits that 
this process of precision-weighting is disrupted in psychosis, such that sensory data is 
assigned too much precision relative to higher-level, more abstract expectations, leading to 
maladaptive statistical inference and learning and thus the development of inaccurate models 
of the world (see Adams et al. 2013; Clark 2016). Further, because of the bi-directional 
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interaction between perceptual experiences and higher-level beliefs within predictive coding, 
inaccurate inferences at lower levels of the inferential hierarchy both influence and are 
influenced by maladaptive higher-level expectations, driving both hallucinations and 
delusions and a complex interplay between them (see Sterzer et al. 2017). Except when stated 
otherwise, reference to the predictive coding model of psychosis in what follows refers to this 
canonical model. 
4. The Social Contents of Delusions 
The canonical predictive coding model of psychosis has many well-advertised attractions (see 
Sterzer et al. 2018). For example, predictive coding comes with an implementational theory 
in which precision-weighting is regulated by the action of neuromodulators such as 
dopamine, and, as noted, there is substantial independent evidence that dopamine 
dysregulation plays a causal role in psychosis. Further, there is compelling neuro-imaging 
and behavioural evidence that individuals with psychosis do exhibit deficits in prediction 
error-driven learning and probabilistic reasoning. Finally, there are interesting simulations 
demonstrating that aberrations in precision-weighting generate effects similar to those 
observed in individuals with psychosis, including in psychological domains such as visual 
tracking distinct from psychosis itself (see Adams et al. 2013). Nevertheless, this theory also 
faces several objections and challenges (see Bell et al. 2019; Williams 2018; and Sterzer et al. 
2018 for a review). Here, we focus on just one: namely, how to reconcile the hypothesis that 
psychosis results from a domain-general dysfunction of the sort posited by this theory with 
the apparent domain specificity of psychosis itself.   
To see this problem, first consider how schematic the proposed account of psychosis is. 
Summarising this explanation, for example, Clark (2013, p.197) writes that   
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“understanding the positive symptoms of schizophrenia requires understanding disturbances 
in the generation and weighting of prediction error… [M]alfunctions within that complex 
economy… yield wave upon wave of persistent and highly weighted “false errors” that then 
propagate all the way up the hierarchy forcing, in severe cases… extremely deep revisions in 
our model of the world. The improbable (telepathy, conspiracy, persecution, etc.) then 
becomes the least surprising…” (our emphasis).  
However, this explanation leaves it opaque why the contents of common delusional themes 
such as persecution and conspiracy should constitute the least surprising hypotheses about the 
world in light of aberrant precision-weighting. Specifically, although dysfunctions in 
precision-weighting and prediction error-driven processing can explain why individuals 
process information in abnormal ways and thus form beliefs that appear implausible to those 
not suffering from the relevant dysfunction, an adequate explanation of delusions must 
explain why individuals form the highly specific delusional beliefs that they come to hold 
(Parrott 2019). That is, psychosis demands an explanation of the distinctive way in which 
psychotic experience is abnormal out of the vast space of possible ways in which it could 
deviate from normal perception and belief but does not.  
Focusing specifically on delusions, the predictive coding model conforms to the standard 
view in the psychiatric literature that the explanandum should be characterised in a way that 
is content-neutral. Thus, the DSM-5 defines clinical delusions as “fixed beliefs that are not 
amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence” (American Psychiatric Association 
2013, p.87). Setting aside the problem that this definition subsumes many widespread non-
delusional (e.g. religious, ideological, self-serving) beliefs, it characterises delusions in a way 
that focuses on their purely formal characteristics, and specifically their irrationality. It 
therefore invites the view that delusions result from inferential or reasoning abnormalities 
(see Gold 2017). Further, because the definition is content-neutral, it strongly suggests that 
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such abnormalities afflict domain-general inferential processes ranging over all possible 
contents of thought. This is a deep problem, however, because – as highlighted above – the 
distribution of delusional beliefs is not a random sample of all possible abnormal beliefs, but 
a highly specific subset, almost all of which concern the individual’s standing in the social 
universe (see Bell et al. 2019; Gold and Gold 2015).  
Further, it is not clear that delusional subjects do exhibit any significant domain-general 
inferential impairments or reasoning abnormalities (see Bell et al. 2019; Gold 2017). At best, 
the voluminous body of empirical research attempting to identify such impairments is 
inconclusive. Perhaps the most influential proposal in this area – often taken as support for 
the predictive coding model of psychosis (Adams et al. 2013) – is that delusional subjects 
suffer from a “jumping to conclusions” bias (Garety 1991). In the famous “beads task”, for 
example, participants are told that there are two jars, A and B, with jar A containing 85% red 
beads and 15% black beads and jar B containing the reverse. On the basis of drawing beads 
from a jar, participants are asked to judge which of the jars the beads come from. The core 
finding is that individuals with psychosis tend to form a judgement on the basis of fewer 
beads than controls (Garety 1991). In addition, recent meta-analyses also indicate small-to-
moderate effect sizes when it comes to other reasoning biases (McLean et al. 2017).  
There are problems with this research, however. For example, often the alleged differences 
between delusional subjects and healthy individuals disappear when controlling for general 
cognitive function, which is known to be reduced in individuals with psychotic symptoms 
(Bell et al. 2019). In some meta-analyses, such as McLean et al’s (2017), theorists do not 
control for possible confounds of this kind. Further, the domain-general reasoning differences 
between delusional subjects and healthy controls are typically small, especially when 
compared to the striking deviations from normality observed in psychosis. Thus, the relevant 
question is not whether delusional subjects exhibit domain-general differences in inference 
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relative to neurotypical controls, but whether – and, if so, in what way – such differences are 
causally responsible for the formation and entrenchment of delusional beliefs. The relatively 
small differences in domain-general inference that have been discovered in the empirical 
literature suggest that such differences might be better understood as effects of other 
underlying factors associated with but not responsible for psychosis, or else factors that 
function as necessary but not sufficient causes of psychotic experience and delusions.  
Importantly, proponents of the predictive coding model of psychosis are aware of at least the 
first of these problems. Thus, Griffin and Fletcher (2017, p.272) refer to  
“the paradox of why, given that we are positing a very domain-general problem with 
weighting information by its reliability in Bayesian inference, delusions tend to be domain 
specific in their content, which usually “seem to concern the patient’s place in the social 
universe” (Bentall et al. 1991, p.14).” 
There are various responses available to proponents of the predictive coding approach. One 
strategy is to appeal to the contents of specific experiences. As noted above, an influential 
theory dating back to Maher (1974) is that delusions constitute attempts to explain – and thus 
derive their contents from – anomalous experiences. This seems highly applicable in many 
cases. For example, Capgras delusion has famously been connected to a dysfunction in which 
facial recognition is disconnected from interoceptive mechanisms in such a way that 
individuals cognitively recognise loved ones but fail to experience any of the typical 
autonomic (i.e. affective) cues that accompany such recognition (Langdon and Coltheart 
2000). This violation of expectations cries out for explanation, thus generating the thought 
that perhaps the “loved one” is really an imposter. Similarly, influential precursors to 
predictive coding described above trace the hallucinated voices and illusions of control that 
are common in psychosis to dysfunctions in sensory predictive mechanisms that make the 
individual’s own voice and actions seem surprising, thus suggesting an external cause.   
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Nevertheless, although it is extremely likely that anomalous experience plays an important 
causal role in delusion formation, there are two problems with locating delusional contents 
wholly in perceptual experiences. The first is that even in cases such as Capgras where one 
can identify a specific anomalous experience, there is still the question of why delusional 
subjects gravitate towards specific delusional hypotheses. As has been widely noted, for 
example, positing an imposter looks like an exceptionally implausible explanation in such 
cases (see Parrott 2019). Not only is the belief in tension both with many other beliefs that 
people hold in general (i.e. about the limits of disguise) and with the testimony of doctors and 
trusted love ones, but there appear to be many other, more plausible explanations of the 
relevant experience (e.g. “there’s something wrong with me”).  
Second, the canonical predictive coding account of psychosis is supposed to apply in cases 
where there are no specific anomalous experiences over and above those generated by 
aberrant precision-weighting. One might respond that aberrant precision-weighting provides a 
computational-level description of – and can thus draw on the explanatory resources of – 
Kapur’s (2003) influential “aberrant salience” model of psychosis described above, according 
to which dopaminergic dysfunction (here understood as aberrant precision-weighting) causes 
otherwise irrelevant stimuli and connections between stimuli to strike the agent as highly 
salient and thus in need of explanation. Once again, however, tracing delusions to a domain-
general aberration in salience attribution predicts that delusional beliefs will range freely over 
all possible topics of attention (Gold and Gold 2015). Further, it is unclear why a hyper-
attention to otherwise irrelevant low-level sensory stimuli (driven by highly weighted low-
level sensory prediction errors) does not merely generate an immersion in the sensory world 
of the sort observed in autism. Indeed, as has been noted (Sterzer et al. 2017), the dominant 
predictive coding account of autism (Lawson et al. 2014) looks highly similar to the 
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canonical predictive coding account of psychosis, which is a problem given the substantial 
dissimilarities in their associated symptoms.  
Another suggestion is that social cognition is likely to be differentially impaired by a domain-
general dysfunction in precision-weighting. For example, Griffin and Fletcher (2017, p.276) 
write that  
“social cues may be inherently more uncertain than non-social ones, because they rely on 
inferring intentions from ambiguous physical acts. Consequently, representations of the social 
world could be the first to break down when the system encounters a relatively minor 
impairment in uncertainty-weighting inference…” 
Even if one accepts that social inference is more difficult than non-social inference, however, 
the social focus of delusions is not characterised by a general breakdown in social inference. 
For example, persecutory delusions are distinctive not just because they diverge from 
ordinary, non-delusional beliefs about the social world, but because of the malign and self-
directed intentions that they attribute to other agents. Why should a paranoid stance towards 
the social world result from greater uncertainty or difficulty in social inference? One 
suggestion is that “aberrant predictive coding could render other people unreliable, to be 
treated with suspicion” (Griffin and Fletcher 2017, p.276; our emphasis). To quote Griffin 
and Fletcher (2017, p.276) again,  
“Just as reduced discriminability in PE [prediction error] signalling could lead to a consistent 
sense of unease or surprise, so too could reduced discriminability between social sources 
make everything (and everyone) seem uniformly unreliable, even suspicious.” 
Again, however, even granting that aberrant precision-weighting might make other people 
seem unreliable – and it is not clear why the substantial divergence between the individual’s 
beliefs and other people’s does not make her question her own reliability – unreliability need 
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not entail suspicion or the attribution of malign intentions. Astrologists are unreliable, but we 
do not generally assume that they are part of a hidden plot to do us harm. Further, in the case 
of persecutory delusions, people’s unreliability manifests itself primarily in disagreement 
over the veracity of the delusions, suggesting that the paranoia is the cause of the epistemic 
estrangement from other people, not the effect of such estrangement.  
Finally, in recent work theorists have posited a novel kind of domain-general inferential 
difference as a potential driver of paranoia. In a set of fascinating experimental studies, Reed 
et al. (2020) demonstrate that paranoid individuals expect greater volatility relative to non-
paranoid controls in a non-social learning task, and they show that this greater expectation of 
volatility can be reproduced in rats exposed to methamphetamine, a drug that is known to 
increase paranoia in humans. They (Reed et al. 2020) take this as “evidence of fundamental, 
domain-general learning differences in paranoid individuals” (p.1), and thus hypothesize 
“that aberrations to these domain-general learning mechanisms underlie paranoia” (p.2; our 
emphasis).  
Granting the existence of such domain-general differences, however, the explanatory 
connection between a greater expectation of volatility and the specific focus and contents of 
paranoia and persecutory beliefs is opaque. Reed et al. (2020, p.2) write that “since excessive 
unexpected uncertainty is a signal of change, it might drive the recategorization of allies as 
enemies” (our emphasis). Why should higher levels of expected volatility drive the 
recategorization of allies as enemies rather than the reverse, however, or no change in their 
status at all? Reed et al. (2020, p.29) suggest that “when humans experience non-social 
volatility… they appeal to the influence of powerful enemies, even when those enemies’ 
influence is not obviously linked to the volatility,” but positing malevolent agency as the 
explanation of volatility without sufficient evidence constitutes an implausible – and so 
presumably unlikely – explanation of volatility. They also suggest that “with a well-defined 
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persecutor in mind, a volatile world may be perceived to have less randomly distributed risk” 
(Reed et al 2020, p.29). It is not clear how connecting volatility to the seemingly unrelated 
actions of agents with hidden and inexplicitly malevolent intentions towards oneself – 
intentions which must be as volatile as the events they cause – is supposed to reduce 
uncertainty, however. Further, it is opaque why populating the world with malevolent agency 
directed towards oneself should be a desirable psychological outcome even if it did reduce 
uncertainty.  
Importantly, our point here is not to deny that human beings might be biased towards 
suspicion and paranoia of the sort highlighted in these explanations. Our point is that these 
biases are independent of any proposed difference in domain-general statistical inference, and 
thus illicitly imported in from contingent assumptions about the human mind. These 
assumptions might be correct, but they reflect aspects of human psychology that are not 
themselves logical consequences of domain-general aberrations in statistical inference.  
4.1. Summary 
To summarise, the predictive coding account of psychosis is both attractive and problematic. 
Although there is compelling evidence that some form of dysfunction in uncertainty 
estimation plays a causal role in psychosis, it is difficult to reconcile such a domain-general 
explanation with the conspicuous domain specificity of psychotic symptoms, especially when 
it comes to delusions. Attempts to avoid this conclusion are either unconvincing or end up 
importing contingent assumptions about human psychology external to the model itself and 
beyond the scope of content-neutral, domain-general learning differences.  
Crucially, this problem seems to stem directly from the emphasis on abstract, domain-general 
inferential processes within Bayesian psychiatry more generally. As noted above, this 
framework is often aligned with predictive processing, a global theory of brain function in 
Page 19 of 33 
 
which the brain is viewed as a general-purpose uncertainty management mechanism 
operating in the service of a single, overarching epistemic goal – namely, minimizing (long-
term, average) prediction error or maximizing model evidence (see Friston 2010; Hohwy 
2013). Thus, Adams et al’s (2013, p.10) article outlining the canonical predictive coding 
account of psychosis involves “[s]tarting with the assumption that the brain is trying to 
maximize the evidence for its model of the world…” (our emphasis). Given this assumption, 
it is difficult to see how the account that they develop could locate psychosis in anything but 
a content-neutral, domain-general dysfunction in statistical inference. This assumption 
abstracts away from almost all of the distinctive functions, motives, interests, and concerns of 
the human mind, however. Thus, perhaps by integrating such contingent features of human 
psychology back into the framework and its starting assumptions, one might be able to 
address the explanatory gap described in this section. We turn to this possibility next.  
5. A Bayesian Social Theory of Delusions 
In recent years, a prominent social framework for understanding delusions has emerged (see, 
e.g. Bell et al. 2019; Gold 2017; Gold and Gold 2015; Raihani and Bell 2019). Although 
highly schematic, the unifying idea underlying this approach is that we should understand 
delusions not primarily in terms of domain-general inferential impairments but rather in terms 
of an evolved social psychology adapted to the recurring features, opportunities, and risks 
encountered in human social life. It is easy to see why this framework has been opposed to 
the predictive coding account – or, more generally, accounts – of psychosis (see, e.g. Bell et 
al. 2019). In this section, we briefly outline this framework and then argue that it can in fact 
be reconciled with Bayesian psychiatry once the latter’s focus on abstract, domain-general 
inferential processes is replaced with a richer view of human psychology in which statistical 
inference mechanisms operate in the context of the distinctive and often idiosyncratic 
functions of the human mind.  
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5.1. The Social Approach to Delusions 
The social approach to delusions is motivated by some of the facts outlined above: for 
example, that evidence of significant domain-general inferential differences between 
delusional subjects relative to neurotypical controls is weak, and that the actual delusional 
themes that occur cluster in a tiny region of the vast space of possible themes, with the 
overwhelming majority concerning the social world (Bell et al. 2019; Gold and Gold 2015). 
According to proponents of a social approach, these and other explananda suggest that 
delusions are better understood in terms of dysfunctions in psychological mechanisms 
specialized for the distinctive problems and opportunities of human social life. As Gold and 
Gold (2015, p.289) put it, “To understand delusions, one has to understand the history of 
human sociality.” Thus, this approach takes its inspiration from an evolutionary framework 
for understanding human psychology, according to which the human mind is best understood 
not as a general-purpose statistical inference mechanism but as a mosaic of specialised 
mechanisms adapted to the distinctive features, opportunities, and risks of human life (see 
Del Giudice 2018).  
Although human social dynamics exhibit massive variation across place and time, this 
variation is underpinned by certain core characteristics. Most fundamentally, human social 
life is characterised by a complex interplay between cooperation and competition at multiple 
scales, including both within and between groups. Success within such environments is thus 
dependent on substantial social support, protection, and interpersonal coordination in the 
service of shared goals, but such cooperation is always fragile given the diverse and often 
divergent interests of individuals and groups competing for dominance, prestige, and 
resources. Further, the difficulties of navigating such opportunities and risks are amplified by 
the suite of unique human traits that underpin cooperation and competition, including 
sophisticated communication abilities (along with the attendant risk of deliberate deception), 
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flexible and reliable mindreading, and highly developed reasoning capacities that facilitate 
long-term plans and complex behavioural strategies.   
How might such characteristics have selected for a psychological apparatus vulnerable to 
delusion? One proposal concerns the evolution of psychological mechanisms concerned with 
detecting and responding to social threats (see Gold and Gold 2015). “Social threat” here 
names a heterogeneous category of costs imposed by other agents and coalitions of agents, 
including those generated by outright violence, exploitation, betrayal, free riding on one’s 
investments, and more. Such threats are ubiquitous and have likely constituted the most 
significant danger to individual survival and reproductive success throughout our ancestral 
past (Dunbar 1998). It is thus highly unlikely that the human mind has evolved to learn about 
the costs, cues, and sources of such threats wholly from experience. Such a blank slate would 
be quickly outcompeted by agents structured in advance of experience to detect, respond to, 
and actively learn about this recurring risk of human social life.  
What characteristics would one expect from psychological mechanisms specialised for 
navigating social threats? First, one would expect them to err on the side of caution (see Gold 
and Gold 2015). That is, given the high – and potentially catastrophic – risk of social threats, 
false positives are likely to be less costly than false negatives. Further, this cost asymmetry is 
exacerbated by the fact that an absence of evidence of social threat does not imply evidence 
of its absence, especially given that the sources of such threats have the capacity and 
motivation to deliberately conceal their intentions from us. Thus, once a genuine suspicion of 
threat is activated, one would expect this suspicion to be difficult to assuage, and for agents to 
downgrade their level of trust in threat-related testimony. In these ways the structural 
characteristics of threat detection might have selected for a mild form of paranoia – or at least 
hypervigilance – even in properly functioning mechanisms (Raihani and Bell 2019).  
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Second, one would also expect the threshold for threat detection – and, by corollary, social 
trust – to be calibrated to the characteristics of the social environment that individuals 
encounter. That is, just as social threat detection mechanisms should motivate individuals to 
learn about and detect specific cues of potential threats, they should also modulate the 
threshold for threat detection in response to the more general statistical characteristics of the 
environment. There is considerable evidence for conditional adaptation of this kind, which 
involves adjustments to the structural development of mechanisms (including information-
processing mechanisms) in response to environmental cues, especially during sensitive 
periods such as childhood (see Del Giudice 2018). Thus, early and/or recurrent exposure to 
social stressors and exploitation would be expected to lower the threshold for social threat 
detection, sometimes in ways that are extremely difficult to change.   
Third, mechanisms of social threat detection need to combine both fast and automatic 
detection of threats – and attention to the potential cues of threats – posed by the immediate 
environmental context with a powerful motivation to ruminate and reflect on the possibility 
of more distant threats generated by complex, future-oriented and deliberately concealed 
intentions (see Gold and Gold 2015). That is, threat detection is not merely – or even mostly 
– a perceptual function but must draw on the resources of reasoning capacities capable of 
both integrating information from diverse sources and of exploring complex hypothetical risk 
scenarios and possibilities.  
Finally, one consideration that has not – to the best of our knowledge, at least – been 
explored in the psychiatric literature is the fact that one’s beliefs about social threats provide 
important information to other agents. Thus, beliefs about the likelihood of social exploitation 
might be influenced by social signalling pressures that adjust one’s level of suspicion not just 
to the available evidence but to the deterrent effect of one’s suspicion on others (see Williams 
2019). In The Godfather, for example, Don Corleone exemplifies how deterrence can 
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motivate a kind of strategic irrationality when he informs fellow mafia bosses of his 
willingness to jump to conclusions without evidence: 
"… I'm a superstitious man, and if some unlucky accident should befall [my son], if he should 
get shot in the head by a police officer, or if he should hang himself in his jail cell, or if he's 
struck by a bolt of lightning, then I'm going to blame some of the people in this room.” 
 
Such considerations help to clarify what is meant by “functional specialization.” Gold and 
Gold (2015; see also Gold 2017) posit a “suspicion system” for detecting and responding to 
social threats, but this terminology carries the unfortunate connotation of a discrete self-
contained cognitive module. As the foregoing suggests, adaptive threat detection requires 
mechanisms that integrate information from a variety of different sources, that are capable of 
substantial learning, and that modulate the activity of other psychological mechanisms 
involved in attention, deliberation, action, and so on. Such information-processing 
mechanisms and procedures are thus not self-contained and are certainly not realised in a 
discrete anatomical module at the macroscopic level of brain structures. Nevertheless, such 
mechanisms are still specialised insofar as their characteristics would not be appropriate for 
many other cognitive tasks, such as estimating the spatial layout of the environment, 
forecasting the weather, or parsing the syntactic structure of a sentence.  
 
As noted, even properly functioning mechanisms of social threat detection might exhibit 
signs of paranoia. Now consider a dysfunction in such mechanisms, however. This 
dysfunction could make individuals less capable of detecting and responding to social threats, 
and thus extremely vulnerable to exploitation. Equally, however, it could make individuals 
overly sensitive to the possibility of social threat, driving their attention towards and 
ruminating on the possibility of such threats in a way that will appear wholly disconnected 
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from objective evidence to other agents. At first, this hypersensitivity to social threat might 
be reined in by conscious reflection on the implausibility of paranoid thoughts. Over time, 
however, hyperactive threat detection might result in an accumulation of evidence that 
overcomes such rational defences and gives rise to entrenched persecutory beliefs, driving 
conscious reasoning away from challenging paranoid thoughts and towards integrating them 
with the rest of the individual’s worldview.   
This is the essence of the model of persecutory delusions advanced by Gold and Gold (2015; 
Gold 2017). As they note, it has myriad attractions. First, it explains why persecutory 
delusions have the specific theme that they do. Of course, contingent features about the 
relevant individual’s time and cultural milieu will no doubt influence what kinds of social 
threats are salient to them, but this model has the advantage of explaining why social threat in 
general is such a common theme of delusional ideation. Second, it accounts for the relatively 
weak differences in domain-general inference found in the empirical literature. Although this 
model is consistent with such differences (see below), it suggests that they are not the sole 
driver of delusions. Third, it illuminates powerful correlations found between various forms 
of social adversity (e.g. trauma, abuse, exploitation) and the risk of clinical paranoia (see 
Raihani and Bell 2019). As noted above, conditional adaptation might have selected for a 
lower threshold for threat detection in response to such circumstances. Finally, there is some 
direct – albeit fairly limited – evidence that social threat detection is specifically impaired in 
conditions such as schizophrenia (see Gold and Gold 2015; Gold 2017).  
Of course, as sketched here and as found in Gold and Gold’s proposal, this model is highly 
schematic. For example, it may be that dysfunctional mechanisms underlying persecutory 
delusions do not track social threat as such but – at least in many cases – specific coalitional 
threats, which could account for why severe paranoia often involves misperceptions of 
coalitional boundaries and collective action (Raihani and Bell 2017). Further, persecutory 
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delusions are obviously not the only kind of delusion. Nevertheless, this model illustrates a 
much more general approach to understanding delusions, one that explicitly connects the 
contents of delusional ideation and beliefs to the distinctive concerns, motives, and functions 
of the human mind, and the psychological mechanisms specialised for such distinctive 
characteristics (Bell et al. 2019; Del Giudice 2018; Gold and Gold 2015).  
5.2. A Bayesian Social Approach to Delusions 
This social approach to understanding delusions appears to conflict with the predictive coding 
model – or, more generally, models – of psychosis (see Bell et al 2019). Nevertheless, the 
apparent domain specificity of delusions need not be in tension with Bayesian modelling as 
such. Indeed, there are various ways in which Bayesian inference generally – and 
uncertainty-weighted prediction error minimization specifically – could accommodate 
domain specificity. Most obviously, domain-specific mechanisms might themselves make use 
of Bayesian computations that infer social threat from ambiguous cues. That is, even if 
psychological mechanisms are “function-specific, their algorithms needn’t be” (Carruthers 
2006, p.62). As Sperber (2019, p.36) puts it,  
“[T]he fact that the formal properties of a learning procedure are best specified without assigning 
to it any specific domain or goal does not entail that the use of such a procedure in an organism or 
a machine cannot be tied and adjusted to specific goals.” 
Such adjustment to specific goals or functions might take various forms. For example, it 
might involve domain-specific priors (Sperber 2019). Given the ubiquity and risks of social 
threats, it is highly like that humans have priors concerning the presence of such threats both 
in general and in specific contexts that need not be acquired wholly from experience. More 
subtly, a central issue for Bayesian inference concerns the hypothesis space itself (Parrott 
2019). In principle, an infinite number of hypotheses could explain any given observation, 
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and a real-life Bayesian inference machine cannot consider all of them. Thus, evolution might 
have endowed the human brain with constraints that narrow and structure the hypothesis 
space within which Bayesian takes place, including the procedures for generating candidate 
hypotheses. For example, people might instinctively consider threat-related hypotheses as 
explanations for events, especially those that strike the person as anomalous or distressing. 
Further, Bayesian decision theory provides a formal framework for explicitly modelling how 
asymmetries in the costs of false positives and false negatives modulate judgement and 
decision-making in different domains (see Williams 2020). Finally, all of these features of 
Bayesian mechanisms could be adjusted in accordance with conditional adaptation, such that 
individuals exposed to early social stressors and exploitation might have higher social threat-
related priors, a greater motivation to generate social threat-related hypotheses, and a lower 
threshold for social threat detection.   
Given such considerations, there is nothing in the social approach to delusions that is in 
tension with the idea that the computational architecture underlying delusions makes use of 
Bayesian inference or prediction error minimization. Indeed, one might view these 
frameworks as highly complementary, with the social approach proposing distinctive 
functions and dysfunctions that underlie delusional cognition at a conceptual level and the 
Bayesian approach generating hypotheses about how such phenomena are implemented in the 
brain’s information-processing mechanisms.  
Return to the canonical predictive coding model of psychosis, for example. At the core of this 
model is the idea that psychosis in schizophrenia is driven by aberrant uncertainty-estimation, 
with a bias towards assigning greater precision to lower-level sensory prediction errors 
relative to higher-level, more abstract expectations. As we have seen, there is compelling 
evidence for this proposal, but it struggles to account for the domain specificity of delusional 
ideation. Adams et al. (2013, pp.1-2), for example, propose that the failure of precision-
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weighting that they posit can be “understood intuitively by considering classical statistical 
inference,” where “if we overestimate the precision of the data…. we expose ourselves to 
false positives.” As noted above, however, positing such abstract, domain-general failures in 
statistical inference as the cause of psychosis fails to account for the highly specific focus of 
delusional ideation and belief. Now consider how such a domain-general difference in 
statistical inference might interact with the functionally specialised machinery for social 
threat detection outlined in the previous sub-section, however.  
First, we have already seen that such machinery is likely biased towards false positives 
independent of any aberration in precision-weighting, perhaps especially so in individuals 
previously exposed to social stressors. Thus, an additional – and perhaps initially domain-
general – bias towards false positives might have a disproportionate effect on social threat 
processing, with threat-related cues coming to seem even more salient and thus capturing the 
individual’s attention.   
Further, as noted, it is similarly plausible that people will have an inherent bias to generate 
and search for hypotheses positing social threats when confronted with anomalous 
experiences in general. Further, the tendency to generate such hypotheses is likely to be 
amplified given the anxiety known to be associated with paranoia and psychosis (see 
Freeman 2007). For example, Pezzulo (2014) has argued that interoceptive cues of anxiety 
(e.g. an increased heart rate and galvanic skin response) provide evidence that can bias 
Bayesian updating towards paranoid inferences that might seem deeply implausible to those 
without the relevant interoceptive evidence, just as the paranoid hypotheses that occur to us 
after watching a horror film at night might seem comically implausible to us when we awake 
the next morning.1  
 
1 The role of anxiety in biasing individuals towards paranoid hypotheses is central to Freeman’s (2007) threat 
anticipation model of paranoia and persecutory delusions.  
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Once the possibility of social threat is seriously entertained as a consequence of one or both 
of these factors, the considerations about threat detection described above – for example, the 
difficulties in finding evidence of the absence of threat, the risks of wilful deception, and the 
potential source of threats in complex and concealed plans – will motivate individuals to 
differentially search out, attend to, and ruminate on threat-related information and 
possibilities, in addition to being on greater guard against the possibility of wilful deception. 
In this way the motivated search for threat-related information and possibilities might interact 
with a general oversensitivity to low-level sensory prediction errors to provide additional 
evidence that fuels the paranoia.  
Whilst at first such paranoid forms of informational-sampling and hypothesis generation 
might be reined in by more global, integrative systems of reflection, over time the apparent 
accumulation of evidence might overpower such defences, changing the focus of conscious 
reasoning away from a reasonable scepticism and towards the development of explanations 
that rationalise the evidence of social threat.2 Thus, this might explain the transition from a 
prodromal phase in schizophrenia in which individuals retain insight concerning the 
implausibility of their paranoia towards to the entrenchment of more fixed persecutory 
beliefs. 
Finally, as the estimated risk of social threat and potential exploitation increases, the 
motivation for increasing the confidence in one’s paranoid thoughts might be further 
incentivised by the deterrent effects of such paranoia on others. Here the willingness to 
identify persecutors and conspiracies in a world that has become increasingly distressing 
serves a protective function, signalling to others a hypervigilance for potential exploitation. 
Although such conspicuous paranoia might serve this protective function well, however, it 
 
2 Note that this might also occur due to more direct damage to those regions of the brain that subserve higher-
level belief integration and evaluation (see Langdon and Coltheart 2000).   
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will also further alienate the individual from others and erode social trust, thereby reinforcing 
the paranoia and its evidential basis further.  
Our repeated use of the word “might” in these suggestions should be emphasised. That is, we 
do not intend these extremely schematic and highly speculative suggestions as a serious 
model of clinical paranoia and the onset of persecutory delusions. Instead, we have advanced 
them to illustrate how augmenting a Bayesian approach to understanding psychosis with the 
content-rich, domain-specific biases and concerns of the human mind helps to broaden the 
hypothesis space for this approach, thus providing a greater range of potential explanations 
when it comes to accounting for some of the distinctive features of psychosis and delusional 
ideation.  
6. Conclusion 
We are convinced of the explanatory power and fecundity of the Bayesian brain and 
predictive coding when it comes to modelling the information-processing dysfunctions and 
aberrations that underlie psychiatric disorders. Nevertheless, we also believe that the 
emphasis within much of Bayesian psychiatry on highly abstract, domain-general inferential 
processes likely blinds it to many distinctive features of human psychology and 
psychopathology. The human brain is not a general-purpose blank slate employing statistical 
algorithms in the service of dispassionate inference, but the control centre of a unique primate 
that evolved to navigate a distinct world of opportunities and risks. This control centre might 
make extensive use of sophisticated statistical learning and inference, but such strategies 
must be understood in the context of the distinctive features, functions, and interests of the 
human mind. We have sought to illustrate this lesson by appeal to a highly influential 
predictive coding model of psychosis, which – we have argued – is currently unable to 
capture the specific contents of delusional ideation precisely because of its exclusive focus on 
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aberrations in content-neutral, domain-general statistical inference. As noted, we are aware 
how schematic and speculative our proposals have been for integrating this application of 
Bayesian psychiatry with a richer, evolutionary framework for understanding human 
psychology. Nevertheless, we hope that this article motivates more extensive, detailed 
investigations into this subject in the future.  
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